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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH DAKOTA
CONTRACT LAW

RODNEY

K.

SMITH*

I. INTRODUCTION
This Article was originally intended to be a survey of all the
contract cases heard by the North Dakota Supreme Court during
the period from 1980 through 1983. The initial research, however,
revealed that the North Dakota Supreme Court heard an
unmanageably large number of contract cases during that time
period. Although it is interesting to note the vitality of contract law
in North Dakota, it became necessary to limit the scope of this
Article to a manageable size. The survey period, therefore, was
limited to cases heard by the court between January 1982 and June
1983 and includes only those contract cases that are of
interest to the North Dakota attorney. These cases are the subject
of this Article.
The largest number of cases that the court heard during the
survey period covered issues regarding the interpretation of
contracts.' The court also heard a substantial number of cases that
*J.D.. J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1977; L.L.M., University of
Pennsylvania. 1982: SJ.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania; Assistant Professor of Law,
University of North Dakota. The author acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Bill Joyce, second
\er las\ student. Univcrsits of North Dakota School of Law fir his assistanct' in researching and
writing
this Article.
1.Sec. e.g.,
Oakes Farming Ass'n \. Martinson Bros., 318 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1982) (discusses
.general rules of contract interpretation). See infra notes 44-144 and accompanying text for a
discussion ofa variety of interpretation issues.
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dealt with damages issues2 and estoppel. 3 The number of cases in
these categories alone tells a story: contract law in North Dakota is
becoming increasingly flexible. For example, in the interpretation
area, the court appears to evidence an increased willingness to look
beyond the four corners of a written document both to ascertain
whether a latent ambiguity might exist and to ascertain the
meaning of an ambiguity. Similarly, the court has been
increasingly willing to recognize promissory estoppel or reliance,
both as a substitute for consideration and as a device to estop one
party from taking undue advantage of another in the contract
context. The court has also recognized that as it increased its
willingness to look beyond the four corners of the contract, for the
sake of achieving a fair result on the facts of a particular case, it was
necessary to use more flexibility in remedial matters. For example,
while the court increased its recognition that some relief should be
given in the case of quasi-contracts 4 or when a party has justifiably
relied upon the actions of another party to its detriment, 5 the court
has been attentive to the need to moderate the remedial portion of
its decisions, giving relief in the form of restitution, reliance, or in
some manner that deviates from the conventional expectation
measure of damages.
Thus, during the period covered in this Article, the North
Dakota Supreme Court has increasingly evidenced a willingness to
apply contract doctrines in a flexible manner. Nevertheless, a
tension is developing in the case law because the court often asserts
a basic fidelity to the freedom of contract and to certainty in
contractual relationships as well, particularly in contexts when the
parties are endowed with essentially equal bargaining power.
This tension, which characterizes much of the contemporary
contract law, surfaces occasionally in the North Dakota cases
covered in the survey period but its ultimate resolution is far from
2. 8ec Hall G.NW. nic. v. Crane Carricr Co. .332 N.\\'.2cf 54 (N.D 1983) (computation and
Altowance of special datmgcs): Storebo v. Foss, :325 N.\\'.2d 22:3 (N.D. 1982) (mea srei of' damages
il a breac'hed cnislriucion contract): Kulseh v. Roitenbergc'r. 320 N.\\'.2d 920 (N.D, 1982)
Idamiagcs i'crovcai n
\,li.nl iasing ;il i(ion ill quantum mnoua): Hohniniin %. Sirillcr. 320) N.\\.2(l

78)6 (N.D.

1982) (distinction bei o'ten incidental and consequential

Scx ciron. :11 N.\V.2d 475 (N.). 1982) (allm aullc intersi s ii
171-99) and actom
yinal
ig ((-Ni liii i discussion of daiiage issues.

daniages): Hirschkorn v.

'llChil
i it1 daiii

.

t- i;!/iip noi0cs

3. Sc, .g.. O'Connell v'. Enwrtainient Enier.. 317 N.\X'.2d 385 (N.D. 1982) (discusses the
tleiicis o 'eqiiiiable and promissory estoppel). See inifra notes 19-43 and actiompanying text fir i
disc'ussion il'equiible
and promissoiy estoppel and other reliance issues.
4.
cSe..'...
Jerry Harion Mo ors. lii-. v. Herb. 316 N.\\'.2d 124 (N.D. 1982) (court idl\\ed
Irto\''i liii lil- prtial i'isi of a fiiiii-\hceel (fit\ -conversiol kii on lii ihicor of q asi-cotiiai Io
hilltsi enirich enut). See in/in noIts 112-23 and accorirparnying text for a discussion of H th.
5. S' . r._. O'Coinil v, Entertainment Enter. 317 N.\\'.2d 38 (N.D. 1982) (discussion of lthe
lhrnents of equitable and promissory estoppel). See inla notes 19-43 and accoipiunyijig tex li a
discussion ofesinppel. reliance. and otihier related issies.

19841

DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACT LAW

certain. Thus, while this Article is not intended to indicate how this
tension is or should be resolved, it is important for the practitioner
to be aware of this tension and its potential ramifications in North
Dakota.
The remainder of this Article discusses the cases covered in the
survey period. The cases are divided into categories by issues. The
first category of cases discusses issues relating to the formation of a
contract. Second, this Article will discuss general and specific
interpretation issues. The third category of cases examines contract
defenses. Fourth, this Article will discuss remedial issues. Finally,
this Article will examine miscellaneous issues relating to contract
law.
Given the broad scope of this Article, it can be little more than
a helpful introduction to contemporary contract law in North
Dakota. Hopefully, this Article will at least fulfill this limited
purpose in a manner beneficial to practitioners.
II. FORMATION
A.

CONSIDERATION

1. E.E.E., Inc. v. Hanson
In E.E.E., Inc. v. Hanson6 the defendant executed a mortgage
to obtain bank financing for a laundromat. 7 Unfortunately, the
bank refused to make the loan. 8 The trial court concluded that the
mortgage was unenforceable since the primary consideration for
the mortgage, the bank loan, had failed. 9 The supreme court,
however, ruled that although the primary consideration had failed,
other good and sufficient consideration existed.10 This
consideration was a preexisting debt that Hanson owed to the
mortgagee, E.E.E., Inc."I The supreme court reasoned that if there
6. 318 N.W.2d 101 (N.D. 1982).
7. E.E.E., Inc. v. Hanson, 318 N.W.2d 101, 106 (N.D. 1982). E.E.E. was building a
laundromat for Hanson. Id. In December 1979 Hanson signed a promissory note payable to E.E.E.
in the amount of $66,233. Id. On February 4, 1980, Hanson executed two mortgages in favor of
E.E.E. Id. The first mortgage covered the laundromat and the second mortgage covered certain
farmland in Griggs County. Id. The mortgages were assigned to Page State Bank to allow Hanson to
obtain financing for the laundromat. Id. The bank discovered that the land was previously
mortgaged and declined to make the loan. Id.
8. The previous mortgage on the property was $83,200 in favor of Hanson's heirs. Id.
9. Id. at 107. Another reason why the trial court decided that the mortgage was a nullity was
that the promissory note on which the mortgage was based did not contain language of unconditional
promise. Id. at 106.
10. Id. at 107. See A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 126 (1963). Professor Corbin indicates
that if two considerations exist for a promise, one of which is legally sufficient while the other is not,
it pro iisc is cnorceablh based upon the legally sufficient consideration. Id.
11. 318 N.W.2d at 107. A preexisting debt is good consideration for a mortgage. Sargent v.
Cooley & Clifford, 12 N.D. 1, 5, 94 N.W. 576, 577 (1902).
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are several considerations and some fail, if the others are good and
sufficient, the good will sustain the promise.' 2 This case clearly
illustrates the lengths to which the court will go to find additional
consideration, even when the primary consideration in a
transaction fails.
Apparently, with the court's holding in Hanson, if the parties
intend for the agreement to be void if the primary consideration
fails, the parties must express this intention within the agreement.
The wise drafter would do well to specify the consideration
contemplated by the contracting parties and the precise effect a
failure of that specific consideration would have on the agreement.
2. Pioneer Credit Co. v. Medalen
The defendant in Pioneer Credit Co. v. Medalen1 3 signed a
guarantee of payment that clearly stated the consideration for the
guarantee was Pioneer Credit's promise to withhold execution on a
judgment against Medalen's daughter and son-in-law.' 4 When the
daughter and son-in-law filed for bankruptcy, Pioneer Credit
sought payment from Medalen.15 Medalen argued that the
guarantee was not supported by sufficient consideration. 16 The
Supreme Court of North Dakota found that Pioneer Credit had
given adequate consideration.' 7 As the court concluded,
"Surrender of a legal right or forbearance constitutes valid
consideration."18

B.

ESTOPPEL: EQUITABLE AND PROMISSORY

1. O'Connell v. EntertainmentEnterprises
Evaluating the plaintiffs equitable estoppel claim, the court in
O'Connell v. Entertainment Enterprises1 9 cited section 31-11-06 of the
12. 318 N.W.2d at 107.
13. 326 N.W.2d 717 (N.D. 1982).
14. Pioncer Credit Co. v. Medalen. 326 N.W.2d 717. 719 (N.D. 1982).
15. /d, a( 718. Pioneer filed suit against Medalen lor payment under the guaranltCC of'paynent,
Id. Medalen initially did not answer the complaint. Id. At the hearing the court granted Medalen a
ten dav extension. Id. Aftier a second hearing, the court entered aLsuniniary .judginen in favor of'
Pioeter. Id.
16. Id. at 719. Medalen also unsuccessfully argued that lie should not be ield liable because he
did nt read the guaratnee of paynent and because his signature was fraudulently obtained. Id. His
supporting affidavits in opposition to the surtrtary judgment itolion. however, failed to establish
either allegationi. Id
17. Id. Surrender of a vatid legal right is good cinsideration. Id. Pioneer surrendered (he legal
right io execute on ajudgment. Id. at 718.
18. Id.
19. 317 N.W.2d 385 (N.D. 1982). O'Connell was the ianager o' (the Crown Colony
Enterainien Center in Grand Forks front January 1977 through August 1981. O'Connell v.
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North Dakota Century Code, 20 which codifies the doctrine, and
Farmers Cooperative Association of Churchs Ferry v. Cole, 2 1 which sets
forth the elements of the doctrine. The court stated,
[T]he basic elements of an equitable estoppel, insofar as
it relates to the person being estopped, are: (1) conduct
which amounts to a false representation or concealment of
material facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey
the impression that the facts are otherwise than those
which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) the
intention, or at least the expectation, that such conduct
will be acted upon by, or will influence, the other party or
persons; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
real facts. Insofar as related to the party claiming the
estoppel, the elements are: (1) lack of knowledge and of
the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in
question; (2) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or
statements of the party to be estopped; and (3) action or
inaction based thereon, of such a character as to change
the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to
22
his injury, detriment, or prejudice.
The court rejected O'Connell's argument that he had a right
to collect back pay from First Federal Savings and Loan and Erin
23
Hotels as manager of the Crown Colony Entertainment Center.
O'Connell argued that he relied on representations made by
First Federal and Erin Hotels in a management agreement. 24 The
court rejected O'Connell's estoppel argument because he had the
Entertainment Enter., 317 N.W.2d 385, 386 (N.D. 1982). His employer, Entertainment
Enterprises, encountered financial difficulties and O'Connell accrued $14,988 in unpaid salary. Id.
First Federal Savings and Loan and Erin Hotels assumed management of the Crown Colony
Entertainment Center from April 16, 1980 through June 30, 1980 at which time Entertainment
Enterprises resumed management. Id. O'Connell sued Entertainment Enterprises, First Federal,
and Erin Hotels for his unpaid salary. Id. at 387. The court granted O'Connell summary judgment
against Entertainment Enterprises for $14,988, but O'Connell was unable to execute on the
judgment. Id. His action against First Federal and Erin Hotels was based on third-party beneficiary
liability and promissory and equitable estoppel. Id.
20. Id. at 389. Section 31-11-06 of the North Dakota Century Code provides: "When a party,
by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and delibeately has led another to believe a
particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he shall not be permitted to falsify it in any litigation
arising out of such declaration, act, or omission." N.D. CENT. COnE § 31-11-06 (1976).
21. 239 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1976).
22. O'Connell, 317 N.W.2d at 389 (quoting Farmers Coop. Ass'n of Churchs Firry v. Cole. 239
N.W.2d 808, 813 (N.D. 1976)).
23. 317 N.W.2d at 387. The court granted surmnary judgment in O'Connell's favor on his
claim for back salary against Entertainment Enterprises. Id.
24. Id. at 389. Specifically, O'Connell alleged that he relied on representations made by First
Federal and Erin Hotels that all of his back salary would be paid under the new management
agreements. Id.
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means available to learn the actual facts concerning his past due
salary. 25 The court found that O'Connell had access to the
underlying management agreements, and that had he read the
agreements he would have discovered that neither First Federal nor
26
Erin Hotels assumed the obligation to pay his past due salary.
The court's holding in O'Connell illustrates its reluctance to
uphold an equitable estoppel claim when the plaintiff claims to be
relying on a representation that is inconsistent with the written
agreement between the parties, particularly when the third party
seeking to estop one or both of the original parties has access to the
written agreement.
Concerning the promissory estoppel claim, the court in
O'Connell stated the elements of the rule as follows: "(1) a promise
which the promissor [sic] should reasonably expect will cause the
promissee [sic] to change his position; (2) a substantial change of
the promissee's [sic] position through action, or forbearance; (3)
justifiable reliance on the promise; and (4) injustice which can only
be avoided by enforcing the promise.' '27
The court held that O'Connell failed to satisfy the elements of
promissory estoppel. Specifically, O'Connell presented no evidence
that he suffered a change in position by relying on the repre28
sentations of First Federal and Erin Hotels.
O'Connell illustrates the importance of formulating findings of
fact for estoppel claims. The claimant must support every element
with sufficient evidence at the trial level in order to survive
appellate review. Failure to do so will lead to quick dismissals of
potentially meritorious claims. Appeals are costly and time
consuming; nevertheless, part of that time is well spent in assuring
that all the facts necessary to support a claim are incorporated in
the trial record.
The O'Connell decision left one question unanswered. The
court recognized that a potential issue existed involving the
relationship between the estoppel doctrines and the statute of
frauds, but the court did not reach the merits of this issue. The
court stated, "Because of our determination that O'Connell has
failed to present facts which bring him within the elements of
25. Id. at 390.
26. Id. The equitable estoppel test requires that the claimant lack both knowledge and the means
of obtaining knowledge. O'Connell had the means to obtain knowledge through the assumption of
management. Id. This information clearly indicated that no one intended to pay O'Connell's back
salary. Id.
27. Id. (citing Union Nat'l Bankv. Schimke, 210 N.W.2d 176, 181 (N.D. 1973)).
28. 317 N.W.2d at 390. The court stated that O'Connell's continued employment after the
alleged promise to pay him back wages could not be construed to mean that he would have
terminated his employment had the promise not been made. Id.
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equitable or promissory estoppel, we find it unnecessary to address
the issue of the conflict between the doctrine of estoppel and the
statute of frauds. "29
2. Cooke v. Blood Systems, Inc.
In Cooke v. Blood Systems, Inc. 30 the plaintiff attempted to make
promissory estoppel a separate cause of action upon which the court
could grant relief. 3 1 The court avoided deciding this issue,
however, by deciding that the plaintiffs failed to prove the parties
actually made a promise that the promisor should have reasonably
expected to induce action or forbearance on the part of the
promisee. The plaintiffs could not maintain a promissory estoppel
claim without proof that such a promise existed between the two
32
parties.
Clearly, one of the basic elements of a promissory estoppel
claim is the existence of a promise, upon which a party may
reasonably rely, as opposed to mere preliminary discussions and
negotiations between the parties. What will suffice to constitute
33
such a promise, however, remains unclear.
3. Ray Co. v. Johnson
In Ray Co. v. Johnson34 the court noted that an equitable
29. Id.
30. 320 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1982). Over a four month period Cooke and Blood Systems Inc.
attempted to negotiate a lease for certain property owned by Cooke. Cooke v. Blood Sys. Inc., 320
N.W.2d 124, 126-27 (N.D. 1982). The parties never entered into a written contract. Id. at 127.
Cooke asserted that the parties had entered into an oral contract or, at the very least, Blood Systems'
actions and words constituted an oral promise upon which he had relied. Id. at 128-29.
31. Id. at 129. Cooke asked the court to adopt S 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as
the basis ofan estoppel claim. Id. Section 90(1) provides:
A ptomise which the iconisor should reasonably expec t to induce action or
libearane on thlie part ofthe promisee or a third person and which does induce such
action or forebearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise. The remedy granted for a breach may be limited asjustice requires.
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 90(1) (1981).
32. 320 N.W.2d at 130.
:" -Se'e. t'.. ,, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores. Inc., 26 Wis. 2t. 583, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965)
(promise element of promissory estoppel claim need not fulfill all the requisite elements of a formal
that it is an assertion that (ould reasonably be relied upon by lie proimisee).
flli: it is eiiuih
34. 325 N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 1982). Ray involved a dispute over the validity of a shareholders'
agreement. Ray Co. v. Johnson, 325 N.W.2d 250, 251 (N.D. 1982). The agreement included a
covenant not to compete in Williams County, North Dakota, a provision allowing for the sale of
certain stock in the Ray Co., and a clause rescinding the agreement upon the sale of the stock. Id. at
250-51.
In 1976, Robert Cook, one of the three shareholders of Ray Co., transferred 20 shares of his
stlock to his son pursuant to the shareholders' agreement. Id. Johnson, a party to the agreement,
worked for Ray Co. until 1978. In 1978, he established a competing business in Divide County. Id.
at 251. Ray Co. brought suit to enforce the covenant not to compete. Id. The district court found the
covenant not to compete valid and enforceable. Id.
RESTATEMENT
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estoppel claim may arise even if the defendant made no express
representations but, rather, simply remained silent. 35 The
defendant's silence, however, standing alone is not enough; the
plaintiff must also establish that the defendant had a duty to speak
out and failed to do so. 3 6 In addition, the plaintiff must prove that
she reasonably relied on the silence, and that there was a resultant
change in her position.3 7 In Ray the plaintiff failed to prove that the
defendant had a duty to speak; therefore, the defendant's silence
was insufficient to constitute an equitable estoppel claim. 38
4. Hall GMC, Inc. v. Crane CarrierCo.
The court in Hall GMC, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co. 39 held that
when, as a part of the trial court's findings of fact regarding fraud,
the lower court found that the defendant acted in good faith,
did not intend to deceive the plaintiff, and did not engage in
any misrepresentations, it could only reverse the trial court on
equitable estoppel grounds if the trial court's findings were clearly
erroneous. 40 The plaintiff also advanced a fraud claim; however,
the court also similarly dismissed this claim. 4 1
Hall offers another example of the importance of carefully
presenting evidence and formulating findings of fact at the trial
level. When a party advances two causes of action, such as fraud
and equitable estoppel, the party should take great care in
presenting evidence and ultimately in drafting findings of fact.
Since the supreme court will only reverse a lower court when the
lower court's factual conclusions are clearly erroneous, every
attorney should take the time to insure the accuracy of the findings
of fact and should carefully delineate those facts necessary to prove
her various claims or causes of action.
5. Summary RegardingEstoppel
Regarding the estoppel doctrines,

three significant issues

35. Id.at 254.
36. Id. The court held that, by the plain language of the shareholders' agreement, itwas
rescinded autonatically upon the sale of stock. Johnson had no duty to expressly invoke the clause
rescinding the agreement. Id.
37. Id. The court noted that Johnson's continucd work alier the parties rescinded the
shareholder agreetnent (lid not prejudice the Ray Co. Id.
38. Id.
39. 332 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1983). The dispute in Hall concerned tie termination of a
distributorship contract. Hall GMC, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co.. 332 N.W.2d 54.57-59 (N.D. 1983).
Crane contended that Hall's action after the alleged termination oi the agreement was suflicient to
equitably estop it frott terminating the agree cte . Id.at 59-60. Further, Crane alleged that even it
the agreement had been terminated, Hall was fraudulent inobtaining the termination. Id.
40. Id. at 60.
4 1. Id.
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remain for the North Dakota Supreme Court to address: (1)
whether a party may raise promissory estoppel as an independent
action in North Dakota; (2) whether the court will adopt the
expansive view of section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts with regards to remedies, which provides that as the
courts become more willing to permit reliance as a substitute for
consideration or for other elements necessary to establish a binding
contract in a formalistic sense, they may adjust the remedy
accordingly; 42 and (3) the extent to which a party may use the
estoppel doctrines to preclude the other party from successfully
asserting the statute of frauds as a defense. 43 Future cases in North
Dakota will undoubtedly yield answers to these important
questions.
III. INTERPRETATION ISSUES
A.

GENERAL INTERPRETATION ISSUES

1. Oakes FarmingAssociation v. Martinson Brothers
Oakes Farming Association v. Martinson Brothers44 offers a view of
several important rules that the North Dakota Supreme Court
consistently follows in contract interpretation cases. First, when the
court must interpret contract provisions it will read and construe
the agreement in its entirety to arrive at the true intent of the
parties.4 5 If possible, the court's inquiry into "intent" will be
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979). The concluding sentence of § 90(1)
provides that "[tihe remedy granted for breach may be limited asjustice requires." Id. § 90(1).
As Professor Farnsworth noted, in conventional contract law when there is a breach:
JTihe ineluctable consequence is that the promise itself is enforceable, and the
prontisee may recover the value of his expectation interest. If, however, the ground of
the promisee's recovery were regarded as his reliance interest, it would seem
appropriate to limit recovery to the value of that interest - the cost to the promisee of
the detriment that he incurred in reliance on the promise. The Restatement Second
alhws the court to proceed on either course, depending on what 'justice requires' in
the circutistances of that particular case.
E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.19, at 96 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
This relaxation of strict contract rules regarding remedies in a breach when the breach is in the
form of a reliance interest, may make the reliance interest even more appealing to the courts; but the
practitioner must remember that what is won in terms of enforcement of the reliance interest may be
lost or significantly limited at the remedial level.
43. See generally Hudec, Restating the "Reliance Interest, " 67 CORNEiAL L. REV. 704 (1982) (recent
discussion of the Restatment (Second) of Contracts position on recovery based upon reliance).
44. 318 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1982). The Oakes case arose out of two sales of farm equipment and
land. Oakes Farming Ass'n v. Martinson Bros., 318 N.W.2d 897. 899 (N.D. 1982). In July 1975
the Streichs sold farmland and equipment to Oakes on a contract for deed. Id. In December 1977
Oakes sold all of its real and tangible property to Martinson, including the property subject to the
contract. Id. In 1978 Martinson failed to make his required payments to Oakes, who in turn was
unable to pay Streich. Id. at 900. This lawsuit was initiated by Streich to foreclose the contract for
deed. Id. Oakes cross-claimed against Martinson based on their sales contract. Id. at 900-01.
45. Id. at 907. Arriving at the intent of the parties from the face of the contract is at times
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46
If
strictly limited to the provisions included in the writing alone.

the contract is ambiguous in any respect, however, the court will
examine the circumstances in which the contract was executed and
the matters to which it relates. 47 The question of whether a contract
48
is ambiguous is always a question of law.
The Oakes decision also highlights the interrelationship
between the trial court and appellate court. If the trial court
determines that a contract is unambiguous, the interpretation of
the contract becomes a question of law for the court to decide. In
this situation, the lower court's holding need not be clearly
erroneous to be reversed at the appellate level. 49 If the contract is
ambiguous, however, and the trial court must refer to extrinsic
evidence to interpret the agreement, those questions to which
extrinsic evidence is adduced are questions for the trier of fact to
determine. 50 In turn, the trial court's findings of fact can only be
disturbed at the appellate level if they are clearly erroneous. 51 In
Oakes, the interplay between these rules led the supreme court to
affirm the lower court's factual determinations. The supreme court
ruled that the contract in question was ambiguous as a matter of
law and, therefore, the trial court's factual determinations relative
to the extrinsic evidence were 5 controlling because they could not be
considered clearly erroneous . 2
The implications of these rules are significant when drafting
an agreement. The drafter should realize that if the court views the
agreement as unambiguous, the court will not examine extrinsic
evidence. This appears to differ slightly from the approach of the
Uniform Commercial Code (Code) parol evidence rule, which
applies in commercial transactions. Under the Code, even if the
contract is unambiguous, the court may refer to the course of
dealing, usage of the trade, and course of performance for the
difficult. A dispute arose between Oakes and Martinson because the contract contained conflicting
paragraphs. Id. Two paragraphs listing the property included within the contract were not consistent
with one another. Id. Martinson alleged that he bought all the property except that specifically
excluded. Id. Oakes alleged that Martinson only purchased the property included in paragraph 2 (c)
(4) of the contract. Id.
46. Id. If the trial court answers the "intent" question frort the contract alone, the court's
conclusion is one of law and is fully reviewable upon appeal. Id.
47. Id. at 908. The trial court found that an ambiguity existed in the contract and used extrinsic
evidence to clarify the contract. Id. The trial court found that the parties intended paragraph 2 (c) (4)
to override paragraph I. On review the North Dakota Supreme Court found the trial court's
determination was not clearly erroneous. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The court in Oakes noted that the determination of whether a trial court's particular
finding is one of fact or law is made by the reviewing court. Id, Further, the reviewing court is not
bound by the labels the trial court placed on the particular findings. [d.
51 Id.
52, Id.
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5 3
purpose of explaining or supplementing the agreement's terms.
In addition, under the Code, if the contract does not contain a
merger clause, additional consistent terms may typically be added
by parol evidence. 54 The North Dakota Supreme Court appears
less willing, however, as a matter of law, to permit the lower court
to examine evidence to supplement or explain an agreement that is
clear on its face. If the court determines that the agreement is
ambiguous, however, the finder of fact may examine extrinsic
evidence related to the intent issue.

2. Kelly-Springfield Tire v. Dakota Northwestern
In Kelly-Springfield Tire v. Dakota Northwestern Bank5 5 the
supreme court addressed the issue of whether and when an
ambiguity is present. The court noted that an ambiguity exists
whenever a good argument could be made for two contrary
meanings of a given term.5 6 The Kelly case involved a letter of
credit that allowed Kelly-Springfield Tire to draw on a bank
account up to $25,000 when the tire company presented a draft and
commercial invoices for goods sold to Raymond Hoffman and
James Mosbrucker. 5 7 The bank refused to honor the letter of credit
53. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-09 (1983) [U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978)1. Section 41-02-09 provides:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or
which are otherwise set torth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression
of their agreement with respect to such terms as are itniluded dtrein may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or itfa contemporaneous oral
agreement but may be explained or supplemented:
1. By course of dealing or usage of trade (section 41-01-15) or by irs of'
ierf'ortiance (section 41-02-15); and
2. Bv evidence of' consistent additional terms unle's tlie iott i inds the
writing to have been intended also as a ,'0tltsit
at d Cx I tsi\'i
stateinen[ tifthe tertits of the agreement.
Id.
Commercial exigencies, which often make it very difficult to memorialize all (Ie terms of an
agreement in a single, tightly drafted contract, undoubtedly justify the flexible approach under the
Uniform Commercial Code. This broad latitude in interpretation is not always available in
noncommercial, conventional contracts. The North Dakota Century Code indicates that a written
contract supercedes all oral stipulations or negotiations. Id. S 9-06-07 (1975). The lack of exigency,
coupled with the unique nature of many noncommercial contracts may very well justify the less
flexible approach regarding parol evidence in contracts outside the commercial arena. If there are
strong parallels between a given noncommercial contract and a typical commercial transaction,
however, a party may be able to argue that the Code should apply by analogy.
54. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-09 (2) (1983) [U.C.C. 2-202(b) (1978)].
55. 321 N.W.2d 516 (N.D. 1982). The dispute in Kelly arose out ifa letter of credit issued by
Northwestern Bank at the direction of Raymond Hoffman in favor of Kelly Tire. Kelly-Springfield
Tire v. Dakota Northwestern Bank, 321 N.W.2d 516, 517 (N.D. 1982). Northwestern Bank issued
the letter of credit so that James Mosbrucker (Hoffman's nephew and the operator of Dakota ire)
coucl ibtain tires
from Kelly Tire at better prices. Id.
56. Id. at 517-18.
57. Id. Northwestern Bank was to pay the letter of credit if Kelly Tire presented the bank with
"(1) 'commercial invoices for goods sold to Raymond Hoffman and James Mosbrucker;' and (2) the
Tire Coimpany's written statement that it has not 'received payment from Raymond Hoffman and
James Mosbrucker for a period of30 days from the date of such invoice.- Id.
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refused to honor the letter of credit when the invoices referred to
sales to Hoffman or Mosbrucker. 5 8 The trial court found an
ambiguity, reasoning that the phrase "commercial invoices for
goods sold to Raymond Hoffman and James Mosbrucker" had
more than one clear meaning. 59 The supreme court disagreed and
60
reversed the trial court as a matter of law.
The court did not rest its decision entirely on its determination
that an ambiguity was not present. The court stated that even if
there was an ambiguity, the district court did not correctly resolve
that ambiguity. 6' While the opinion appears to leave open the issue
of whether extrinsic evidence may be presented to prove a latent
ambiguity, it is clear that the court is very reticent to find an
ambiguity when the terms of the agreement are only susceptible of
one good interpretation.
3. Sorlie v. Ness
In Sorlie v. Ness 62 the supreme court again examined its
standard rules related to the interpretation of contracts. If the
contract is unambiguous and the intent of the parties can be
ascertained from the writing alone, the interpretation of the
contract is a question of law. 63 In determining whether a contract is
ambiguous, the North Dakota Supreme Court will independently
examine and construe the agreement to determine if the lower
court erred as a matter of law. 64 If the court finds as a matter of law
that the parties' intentions are ambiguous and that extrinsic
evidence should be admitted, however, questions with regard to
which extrinsic evidence is adduced are questions for the trier of
fact. 65

In Sorlie the court interpreted a stock transfer agreement in
which Evelyn Ness agreed that in the event she desired to sell or
58. Id. at 518.
59. Id. at 520.
60, Id. The court stated, "Wjhat good argument (-an be made coerning tie two meanings of
the phrase 'commercial invoices fln goods sol to Raytond Holinatt and.Jants Moshru'kc"?
r
hc
better argument is that the phrase is clear and it means exactly what it says." (etiphasis in original.)
Id.
61. Id.
62. 323 N.W.2d 841 (N.D. 1982). The court in Sorlie interpreted a stock transfir agreement by
which Evelyn Ness agreed to give Alton Glenn Sorlie an opportunity to purehase her stock in the
Bismarck Tribune before she sold or transferred it to a third party. Sorlic v. Ness, 323 N.W.2d 841,
842 (N.D. 1982).
63. Id. at 844. Section 9-07-04 ol the North Dakota Century Code provides in part that "the
intention of the parties is ti be ascertained from the writing alone, ifipossible.
N.D. CENT.
ConDE § 9-07-04 (1975).
64. 323 N.W.2d at 844.
65. I/.

19841

DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACT LAW

239

transfer her stock in the Bismarck Tribune Company she would
grant a prior option to Alton Glenn Sorlie. 66 If Alton refused to
exercise this option within 90 days, she would make a similar offer
to the Bismarck Tribune Company. 67 The option agreement also
expressly made the options binding upon the heirs, personal
6
representatives, and assigns of the parties.
Justice VandeWalle, writing for the majority, held that while
paragraph three of the agreement dealing with the option itself
seemed to refer only to sales made by Evelyn during her lifetime,
paragraph four made the agreement binding on Evelyn's heirs and
assigns. 69 Since the meaning and relationship of the terms in
paragraph three and four were ambiguous as a matter of law, the
supreme court held that the trial court properly admitted parol
evidence to explain or clarify the parties' intentions with regard to
the time period covered by the option.7 0 The court concluded that
there was an ambiguity as a matter of law because otherwise one of
the provisions, paragraph three or paragraph four, would be

66. Id.at 842. The stock transfer agreement provided:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
WHEREAS, STELLA IRENE MANN, of Bismarck, North Dakota, as PARTY
OF THE FIRST PART, has heretofore transferred ten shares of stock in the Bismarck
Tribune Company, a North Dakota corporation, Bismarck, North Dakota, to
EVELYN IRENE NESS, of Whitesboro, New York, as PARTY OF THE SECOND
PART, and the parties having entered into an agreement relative to the consideration
thereof, DO NOW FURTHER AGREE:
I. That in consideration of the promises and the covenants of the parties
hereifore made, the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART agrees not to assign,
transfer, sell, or convey the said stock, or any part thereof, without the written consent
of the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART.
2. That in the event it shall become necessary or should PARTY OF THE
FIRST PART deem it advisable to sell all of the issued stock in the corporation to
another firm or corporation, PARTY OF THE SECOND PART grants to PARTY
OF THE FIRST PART full authority to assign, transfer, and convey the stock herein
mentioned as fully and effectually as PARTY OF THE SECOND PART might or
could do, and that payment upon such transfer shall be made to PARTY OF THE
SECOND PART in accordance with a prior agreement ofthe parties.
3. That PARTY OF THE SECOND PART specifically agrees, in the event she should
deire to sell or transfer the stock, that she will grant and does grant a prior option to purchase to
Alton Glenn Sorlie at the established book value for such stock; and in the event the
said Ahon Glenn Sorlie shall not exercise such option to purchase within a period of
ninety (90) days, then a similar offer shall be made to the Bismarck Tribune
Company, and, if such company does not elect to purchase the stock, then the
PARTY OF THE SECOND PART shall have the right to dispose of the same to any
person as she may desire.
4. That this agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, personal representatives, and assigns sf
the parties.
/d.(emphasis added by the court).
67. Id.
68. Id.at 842.
69. Id. at 846.
70. Id. Whether the agreement was binding on the heirs and assigns of Evelyn Ness was the
crucial determination in tsis case. Evelyn Ness died in 1976, and the sale in qucsion was by her son
and heir, )ale Ness. Id. at 843.
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rendered meaningless.71
Having determined that there was an ambiguity as a matter of
law, the court examined the oral testimony of the attorney who
drafted the agreement to aid the court in ascertaining the parties'
intent. 72 Based on the attorney's testimony, the court concluded
that the option to Sorlie and the Bismarck Tribune Company was
to take effect in the event that Evelyn Ness or her heirs tried to
transfer stock outside the Ness family.73
Chief Justice Erickstad 74 and Justice Pederson 75 dissented.
ChiefJustice Erickstad construed the option agreement differently,
arguing that it was intended to remain effective only during Evelyn
Ness' lifetime. 76 Chief Justice Erickstad believed that nothing
contained in the written agreement was susceptible to the
majority's interpretation and that the court was, therefore, merely
using the parol evidence rule to rewrite the agreement. 77
Justice Pederson took a different approach. He asserted that
the court should interpret the agreement strongly against the
drafter, in this instance, Stella Mann. 78 He also believed the
agreement was analogous to an adhesion contract, drafted by one
party (Stella) and only adhered to by the other party (Evelyn). 79 As
such, Justice Pederson argued the agreement should have been
strictly construed to insure protection of Evelyn's interest. 8 0
The Sorlie case illustrates the heavy burden placed on attorneys
drafting agreements. By a slim majority of the court, the parties'
intent, established by the testimony of Stella's attorney, prevailed.
To protect one's self and one's client when drafting an agreement,
the attorney should incorporate substantial written recitals of fact
71. 1d. at 847.
72. Id. at 847-48.
73. Id. at 848.
74. Id. at 849 (Erickstad, C.J., dissenting).
75. Id, at 850 (Pederson, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 849 (Erickstad, C.J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 850. (Pederson, J., dissenting) Evelyn Ness acquired her stock in the Bismarck
Tribune, subject to the shareholder's agreement, from Stella Mann. Id. at 842.
In interpreting the agreement, Justice Pederson relied on sections 9-07-14 and 9-07-19 of the
North Dakota Century Code. Section 9-07-14 provides: "[I1f the terms of a promise in any respect
are ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interpreted in the sense in which the promisor believed at the
time of making it that the promisee understood it." N.D. CENT. CODE 5 9-07-14 (1975).
Section 9-07-19 provides:
In cases of uncertainty not removed by the preceding rules, the language of a contract
should be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to
exist. The promisor is presumed to be such party, except in a contract between a
public officer or body, as such, and a private party, and in such case it is presumed
that all uncertainty was caused by the private party.

Id. § 9-07-19 (1975).
79. 323 N.W.2d at 850 (Pederson,J., dissenting).
80. Id.
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into the agreement to assure that the intent of the parties is clear. In
addition, the attorney should take great care during the drafting
process to assure the express terms follow the intent elaborated in
those recitals.
4. Bohn v. Bohn Implement Co.
In Bohn v. Bohn Implement Co. 81 an ambiguity issue was also
involved. In Bohn the ambiguity involved a partnership agreement
with a buy-out option that specified the price for buy-out to be the
"capital amount" of the business.8 2 An accountant testified that
"capital amount" had no known definition in the accounting
profession.8 3 Taking this into account, the supreme court agreed
84
with the trial court that the agreement was ambiguous on its face.
The court reiterated the general rule that when the court cannot
ascertain the parties' intent from the writing alone, interpretation
85
of the contract becomes a question of fact.
The trial court held that the contract was ambiguous and fixed
the purchase price at fair market value.8 6 The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's finding, holding that when an agreement
concerning the price in a partnership buy-out is ambiguous, the
party asserting that the agreed price is below market value must
prove the validity of the agreement by clear and convincing
evidence. 87 Since Graydon Bohn, the buying party, failed to meet
this burden, the trial court was correct in reforming the agreement.
The Bohn case illustrates once again the importance of clarifying the
dl. 325 N.W.2d 281 (1982).
82. Bolhn v. B ln Ihplement Coc., 325 N.W.2d 281, 283 (1982). The iartnership agreement
was between Clvde and Graydon Boihn. Id. at 281-82. The principle business ofl the partnership was
Ihriiig. /d. at 282. The I)LUV-OUtprovision providel:
A. The vale i" the partnership interest ol'Clyde M. BoIlin or Grayh n J. Bohn,
Sr.. Ibr the purpose olfthis agreement, shall ce:
a. The capital amount ii'the decedent's interest as shown by the bnks of'
(he partnership as of the end of the last fiscal year beficre his death, plus
I1. the decedent's share of profits, or less the decedent's share of losses, of
the partnership computed to the last day of the month in which his death
occurred less all withdrawals prior thereto during such fiscal year. It is agreed
that there is no value for godwill or firm name and nii such value has been
included in the price arrived at hereinabove.
Id. at 283.
Clyde Bohn died in 1980 and Graydcn Bohn inficried the estate that lii intended to buy out
Clyde's share and coffered $134,497.96. Id. at 282. The estate rejected the offer and this litigation
ensued. Id.
83. Id. at 283. Since "capital amount" as used in the agreement was not dtleinable, tie buy-out
provision was ambiguous and a buy-iout amount cculd nict be readily detcruined. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 282.
87. Id. at 285. Sec tic 45-09-14 of the North Dakota Century Code rquired the (c ur( to award
the fair market value It tcie estate. See N.D. CEN T".CojE § 45-09-14 (1978).
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intent of the parties at the drafting stage, because absent such
clarification, the court may rewrite or reform the agreement.
5. Keller v. Hummel
In Keller v. Hummel"8 the supreme court reversed the trial
court's determination that the contract was not ambiguous as a
matter of law. 8 9 Keller contracted to purchase a quonset from
Hummel with final payment due on or before April 15, 1980, but
Keller did not have to actually claim it until April 15, 1982.90 Keller
did not attempt to make final payment until April 1982, at which
time Hummel refused to close the sale. 9 1 The trial court found that
the sale contract was unambiguous and that the sale was completed
in April 1982.92 The supreme court reversed, finding a potential
ambiguity in the time element of the contract. 93
6. St. Clair v. Exeter Exploration Co.
In St. Clair v. Exeter Exploration Co. 94 the Court of Appeals for
88. 334 N.W.2d 20(1 (N.D. 1983). In Keller the buyer and seller of a quonset disputed the
interretation of the sales contract. Keller v. Hummel, 334 N.W.2d 200, 201-02 (N.D. 1983).
89. Id.at 203. The court found that the parties' intentions concerning whether time was of the
essence could not be ascertained from the face of the writing alone. Id.
90. Id.at 201. While the quonset remained in Hummel's possession, Keller had a right, which
lie exercised, to store grain in it. Id.
91. Id. Hummel contended at trial that Keller told him that lie had no use for the building and
thatth contract could be cancelled. Id.
92. Id. at 202 n.3. The district court awarded the quonset to Keller on a motion lor partial
sutitmary judgment. Id. at 202. The district'court left open for trial any claim if damage that Keller
might have had against Hummel. Id.
93. Id. at 203. The supreme court was confused by the time elements in the contract. Id. The
contract required Keller to pay for the quonset by April 15, 1980. but there were no words to indicate
fhat failure to do so would be grounds for cancellation. Id. Regarding the time ambiguity, the court
stated: "IU nless the intent that time is of the essence is manifest frot the face ifthe
contract, it is a
question to be determined by the trier of fact and summary judgment should not be granted if'
reasonable men could differ on the issue." Id.
The supreme court remanded the case to the trial court for trial on the issues raised by the
ontraut(. Id. at 204. While the supreme court did not address the contract interpretation issue, it did
infirit time trial court that it felt the contract should not be cancelled. Id. The supreme court stated in
closing that "a mere dispute regarding an incidental portion ofa contract which invulves only the
payient of nmoney does not justify a rescission of contract.'" Id.
94. 671 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1982). Clinton St. Clair and Don Bills were in the business of
finding potential petroleum and gas production areas, acquiring the necessary leases to develop the
areas, and selling the package to oil and gas developers for an overriding royalty. St. Clair v. Exeter
Exploration Co., 671 F.2d 1091, 1092 (8th Cir. 1982). An overriding royalty is a "fractional interest
in the gross production of oiland gas under a lease, in addition to the usual royalties paid to the
lessor, free of any expense for exploration, drilling, development, operating, marketing, and other
costs incident to the production and sale of oil and gas produced from the lease." Meeker v.
Ambassador Oil Co., 308 F.2d 875,882 (10th Cir. 1962), rev'd, rev'd. 375 U.S. 160 (1963).
St. Clair and Bills put together a package of leases near Bottineau and sold a one-half interest in
the package to Exeter Exploration subject to a Turnkey Agreement. 671 F.2d at 1093. A Turnkey
Agreement requires the developer to complete a well to the point at which it is ready for productiin.
Id. at 11093 n.7 (citing Continental Oil Co. v. Junes. 177 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1949)). The Turnkey
Agreement provided that St. Clair and Bills retained at one-eighth overriding ruyay in tietpkckage.
671 F.2d at 1093. The agreement further provided that St. Clair would be entitled to a uone-sixteenth
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the Eighth Circuit held that in determining whether there is an
ambiguity in the terms of an agreement, the court should examine
the disputed language in the context of the entire agreement. 95 The
court added that evidence relating to prior negotiations and other
circumstances surrounding the making of the contract should be
considered in determining whether the contract is in fact
96
ambiguous.
The court of appeals applied the parol evidence rule in St. Clair
with a laxity that may not be characteristic of the North Dakota
Supreme Court's analysis. The eighth circuit, applying North
Dakota law, was willing to look at extrinsic evidence to determine
whether or not there was a latent ambiguity. 97 The Supreme Court
of North Dakota, however, appears to limit its analysis much more
circumspectly to the four corners of the agreement when
interpreting a contract not covered by the Uniform Commercial
Code. 98 This apparent difference, at least as a matter of degree, in
terms of how the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the
North Dakota Supreme Court view extrinsic evidence to determine
whether or not an agreement is ambiguous, may make it
worthwhile for an attorney with a parol evidence problem to do
some forum shopping, whenever possible.
B.

SPECIFIC

INTERPRETATION

ISSUES:

COVENANTS

NOT

TO

COMPETE

1. Ray Co. v. Johnson
The supreme court in Ray Co. v. Johnson9 9 used two rules of
interpretation in construing a covenant not to compete. First, the
overriding royalty in any additional property added to the package. Id.
The initial drilling in the package area was unsuccessful. Id. at 1094. St. Clair and Bills
renegotiated some leases within the package and entered into a Letter Agreement that concerned
drilling the specific leases. Id. The Letter Agreement had a twelve month expiration date. Id. The
drilling was once again unsuccessful. Id.
Finally, Exeter Exploration entered into a separate lease agreement to drill on land that was
included in both the original Turnkey Agreement and the Letter Agreement. Id. The drilling
resulted in producing wells and St. Clair demanded payment of his overriding royalty pursuant to
the Turnkey Agreement. Id. at 1095. Exeter refused to pay, alleging that the Letter Agreement,
which had expired, controlled payment of the royalties in question. Id.
The federal district court noted that the existence of the two agreements created an ambiguity
concerning which agreement was controlling. Id. The court, therefore, admitted parol evidence.
Based on the parol evidence, the court found the Turnkey Agreement controlling. Id.
95. 671 F.2d at 1095-96.
96. Id. at 1096.
97. Id.
98. See Oakes Farming Ass'n v. Martinson Bros., 318 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1982) (the North
Dakota Supreme Court effectively limited its analysis of a potential ambiguity to the four corners of
th6 document). See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of Oakes.
99. 325 N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 1982). See supra note 34 for a discussion of the facts in Ray Co. v.
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court reasoned that because it had determined that the ambiguity
in the agreement could be resolved by examining the written
agreement alone, the parol evidence offered by the plaintiff was
inadmissible. 10 0 Second, the court noted that an ambiguity would
be construed against the drafter of the agreement who supposedly
protected his or her best interests in drafting the agreement. 1°1
Using these two rules of construction, the supreme court reversed
the trial court and held that since the agreement had terminated by
its own terms, it was not necessary to determine the scope or
enforceability of the covenant not to compete. 102
2. Hawkins Chemical, Inc. v. McNea
In Hawkins Chemical, Inc. v. McNea'013 Hawkins and McNea
entered into an agreement, which included a covenant not to
compete in a six state area, including North Dakota.10 4 Under the
North Dakota Century Code, a covenant not to compete is only
enforceable if the geographic area is within a specified county, city,
or a part of either. 10 5 The trial court ruled that the covenant
Hawkins and McNea entered into was overbroad, and therefore
was void. 106 The supreme court, however, reformed the agreement
to make the covenant not to compete enforceable in Ward
County. 0 7 The court believed the contract should be reformed
100. Ray Co. v. Johnson, 325 N.W.2d 250, 251-52 (N.D. 1982) (citing Sorlie v. Ness, 323
N.W.2d 841, 844 (N.D. 1982)). See supra notes 62-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sorie
v.Ness.
101. 325 N.W.2d at 252 (citation omitted). See also N.D. CENT. ConE 5 9-07-19 (1975). Section
9-07-19 provides in part that "[in cases of uncertainty. . . the language of the contract should be
interpreted most strongly against the person who caused the uncertainty to exist." Id.
102. 325 N.W.2d at 253.
103. 321 N.W.2d 918 (ND. 1982). Hawkins Chemical purchased Mon-Dak Corporation from.
Lloyd McNea and R. F. Saunders. Hawkins Chemical, Inc. v. McNea, 321 N.W.2d 918, 918-19
(1982). As part of the total agreement McNea and Saunders entered into a covenant not to compete
with Mon-Dak in a six state area, which included North Dakota. Id. at 919. Hawkins paid $2-18,000
for the noncompetition agreement, which was separate from the sales contract. Id. Shortly thereafter,
McNea began a chemical sales business in Ward County, North Dakota in violation of the
agreement. Id. Hawkins Chemical brought suit to enjoin McNae from further operation of his
business. Id.
104. Id.
105. N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-08-06(1) (1975). Section 9-08-06(1) provides:
Every contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession,
trade, or business of any kind is to the extent void, except:
1. One who sells the good will of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain
from carrying on a similar business within a specified county, city or a part of either,
so long as the buyer or any person deriving title to the good will from him carries on a
like business therein.
Id.
106. 321 N.W.2d at 919.
107. Id. at 920. The court noted that it had previously reformed covenants not to compete to
conform with § 9-08-06. Id. at 919-20.
For example of a case in which the court reformed an overboard covenant not to compete, see
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since the seller had presumably received pecuniary compensation
for the covenant and, therefore, should not be allowed to escape
entirely from the consequences of his promise.1 08
Justice VandeWalle dissented because he would not have
reformed the agreement. 10 9 He added that since the court
reformed the agreement, he believed the covenant should be
enforced in the county where the business was presently located
rather than in Ward County. 1 0
Any attorney that drafts a covenant not to compete in an
agreement for the sale of a business should pay specific attention to
the limitations placed on these covenants in North Dakota Century
Code section 9-08-06.11 Although the court in Hawkins reformed
the overbroad covenant, the disagreement between the majority
and Justice VandeWalle over the area covered by the reformed
covenant illustrates the importance of having the parties determine
the covenant's coverage rather than leaving the issue to the courts.
C.

SPECIFIC INTERPRETATION ISSUES: QUASI-CONTRACTS

1. Jerry HarmonMotors, Inc. v. Heth
In Jerry Harmon Motors, Inc. v. Heth1 2 a dispute arose over the
payment for a conversion kit installed in a new van Gary Heth
purchased from Jerry Harmon Motors." 3 The auto dealer claimed
that the parties had reached a binding agreement whereby the
defendant agreed to pay for the conversion kit as an additional
charge.114 Heth claimed that the- cost of the conversion kit was
included in the cost of the vehicle."1 5 The trial court held that all of
Igoe v. Atlas Ready-Mix, Inc., 134 N.W.2d 511 (N.D. 1965) (court struck Mandan from a covenant
not to compete in Bismarck and Mandan, North Dakota).
108. 321 N.W.2d at 919. Hawkins Chemical contracted to pay an additional $218,000 for the
covenant not to compete over a period of three years. Id. Hawkins had already paid $150,000. Id.
109. Id.at 920-21 (VandeWalle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110. Id. at 921 (VandeWalle, J., concurring in part aid dissenting in part). Hawkins Chemical
was running a business in McLean County rather than Ward County. Id. Justice VandeWalle
indicated, therefore, that the covenant not to compete should have been for McLean County. Id.
111. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1975). See supra note 105 for the pertinent portion of § 9-0906.
112. 316 N.W.2d 324 (N.D. 1982).
113. Jerry Harmon Motors, Inc. v. Heth, 316 N.W.2d 324. 325 (N.D. 1982). The conversion
kit changed the van from two-wheel to four-wheel drive. Id. Heth and Harmon Motors entered into a
retail installment contract in which Heth was to pay $8800 for a 1975 GMC four-wheel drive van. Id.
Heth paid the down payment of $1800 and left the dealership to obtain insurance. Id. Upon his
return, Harmon Motors informed him that the price of the vehicle did not include the conversion kit.
Id. The dispute arose over who would bear the cost of the conversion kit. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. Apparently, a considerable discussion took place between Heth and Harmon Motor's
credit manager, Jess Ditworth, over who would bear the cost of the conversion kit. Id. At the
conclusion of the discussion each party believed the other was going to pay for the conversion kit and
that the kit would cost no more than $2000. Id.
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the formalities necessary to constitute an enforceable contract
concerning the conversion kit were not present, but held in favor of
Jerry Harmon Motors based on quasi-contract.1 1 6 The Supreme
Court of North Dakota affirmed. 117 The court noted that recovery
on quasi-contract was based on the theory of unjust enrichment. 1 18
In Harmon the court found that the benefit was the kit, which Heth
had retained but in equity belonged to the dealer. 119
In calculating the damages based on unjust enrichment or
quasi-contract, the supreme court noted that the trial court had
failed to make a finding concerning the understanding between the
parties regarding the cost of the kit. 120 Although an issue of fact
would normally be remanded to the lower court as the trier of fact,
the supreme court decided that it should make indispensable
121
findings of fact in order to promote justice and judicial economy.
The court examined the evidence and concluded that the defendant
understood that he would have to pay for the cost of the conversion
kit in an amount not to exceed $2000.122 The supreme court, therefore, reduced the trial court's $3168 damage award to $2000.123
IV. SPECIFIC INTERPRETATION ISSUES
A.

TIME Is OF THE ESSENCE CLAUSES

1. Keller v. Hummel
In Keller v. Humme1 24 the contract's status rested on whether
there was an enforceable time is of the essence clause. 125 If there
was an enforceable time is of the essence clause, Keller's failure to
tender payment at the specified time discharged Hummel from any
further obligation. 126 If time was not of the essence, however,
116. Id. at 327.
117. Id. at 330.
118. Id. at 328. See Contract, Tort and Restitution - A Satisfactory Division or Not?, 99 LAW Q. REV.
217, 233-34 (1983). The author asserts that the courts should drop the facade of implied or quasicontract and admit that their opinions are based on a desire to avoid unjust enrichment of a party. Id.
119. 316 N.W.2d at 330.
120. Id. at 329. The trial court did find, however, that Gary Heth was liable for the cost of the
conversion kit. Id.
121. Id. at 330.
122. Id. The credit manager ofJerry Harmon Motors testified that he told Heth that the cost of
the conversion kit would be between $1200 and $2000. Id. at 325.
123. Id. at 339. The supreme court apparently believed that Heth could not impliedly agree to
pay more for the conversion kit than the top price quoted by the auto dealer at the time of the sale. Id.
124. 334 N.W.2d 200 (N.D. 1983). See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the facts in Kellerv. Hummel.
125. Keller v. Hummel, 334 N.W.2d 200, 203 (N.D. 1983). The sales agreement stated that
Keller was to make a down payment of $2000 by April 25, 1979 and pay the remaining 51500 by
April 15, 1980. Id. at 201. The agreement did not state what should happen if payment was late. Id.
126. Id. at 203.
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Keller could tender payment within a reasonable time. 12 7 The
North Dakota Supreme Court held, however, that it could not
determine whether time was of the essence from the writing alone
and remanded the case to permit the parties to present extrinsic
128
evidence to determine the issue.
2. E.E.E., Inc. v. Hanson
In E.E.E., Inc. v. Hanson129 the North Dakota Supreme Court,
reiterated the general rule that when time, either expressly by the
terms of the contract or by a reading of the intent of the parties, is
of the essence, the parties must perform at the exact time specified
0

in the contract.13

If a time is of the essence clause is included in a contract, the
parties must perform within the specified time. 131 Even if the clause
is not expressly provided, the court may rule that the intentions of
the parties were sufficient to make time of the essence. 132 An
attorney should take special care in advising clients concerning
time is of the essence clauses because the failure to perform at the
specified time releases the other party of all future obligations
under the agreement. Under any circumstances, the attorney must
apprise a client of the necessity of performing on time if such a
clause is included or intended in a contract, and the attorney should
discuss the matter with the client at the drafting stage.
B.

ACCELERATION CLAUSES

1. Johnson v. King
The defendant, King, in Johnson v. King 3 3 executed three
127. Id. at 203-04. The court noted that the determination of whether the payment is tendered
within a "reasonable time" is a fact question that must be decided on a case by case basis. Id. at 203.
128. Id. at 204. the case was before the supreme court on appeal after the trial court had
granted a motion for summary judgment. Id. The court did not have a sufficient record, therefore, to
reach the merits. Id.
129. 318 N.W.2d 101 (N.D. 1982). See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the facts in E.E.E., Inc. v. Hanson.
130. E.E.E., Inc. v. Hanson, 318 N.W.2d 101, 104 (N.D. 1982). See N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-0723 (1975). Section 9-07-23 provides that "[tlime is of the essence of a contract if it is provided
expressly by the terms of the contract or if such was the intention of the parties as disclosed thereby."
Id.
131. 318 N.W.2d at 104. See also Fargusson v. Talcott, 7 N.D. 183, 186-87, 73 N.W. 207, 208
(1897). Referring to a contract with a "time is of the essence" clause, the North Dakota Supreme
Court in Fargus.on stated that "in such a case failure to comply with the terms of the contract, at the
time named therein for performance, will debar the person in default from claiming any rights
thereunder, even in a court of equity." Id. at 188, 73 N.W. at 208.
132. 318 N.W.2d at 104. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-23 (1975). See supra note 130 for the text
of § 9-07-23.
133. 325 N.W.2d 254 (N.D. 1982).
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documents: a $500,000 promissory note payable to the plaintiff,
Johnson, on April 1, 1985; a mortgage deed on certain described
property securing the note; and an assignment of rents on the
property covered by the deed. 134 The note provided for biannual
payments of interest until April 1, 1985, when the balance of the
note was due. 135 The promissory note did not include an
acceleration clause, but the mortgage did. 136 King, the defendant,
failed to make an interest payment when due, and the Johnsons
37
attempted to foreclose on the property. 1
The court noted that the. general rule with regard to
acceleration clauses was that an acceleration clause in a note
accelerated a mortgage, even if the mortgage did not contain an
acceleration provision. 1 38 The court further noted that most
jurisdictions hold that even when there is no acceleration clause in
the note, an acceleration clause in the mortgage will enable the
holder to accelerate the maturity if there is a breach.13 9 The court,
however, continued to follow what it perceived to be the minority
rule that the acceleration clause in a mortgage is not transferred to
and does not become a part of a promissory note unless the
40
agreement specifically so provides. 1
This position treats the note and mortgage as separate and
distinct instruments. 141 In the event of default, the mortgagee has
an election of remedies. She may sue on the note and obtain a
personal judgment, or she may proceed against the security of the
mortgage and apply the proceeds of the foreclosure sale to the
debt. 142 The mortgagee, however, may not obtain double
satisfaction or relief. 14 The court, therefore, reasoned that an
acceleration clause in a mortgage would not become a part of a
promissory note unless the contracting parties specifically so
provided. 1 44 As King amply illustrates, the drafter should be
134. Johnson v. King, 325 N.W.2d 254, 255 (N.D. 1982).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 255-56. The acceleration clause stated that "if default be made by the party of the
first part in any of the foregoing provisions it shall be lawful for the parties of the second part, their'
heirs, executors, administrators, successors or assigns, or their attorney to declare the whole sum
above specified to be due." Id.
137. Id. at 256. TheJohnsons appealed the denial of their motion for summary judgment. Id.
138. Id. (citing 55 AM.JuR. 2DMortgages 5 379, at 476-77 (1971)).
139. 325 N.W.2d at 256.
140. Id. at 256-57. The court referred to the language in American Jurisprudence Second that
stated "there is also authority proceeding upon the theory that an acceleration provision in a
mortgage securing a note does not affect the maturity of the note for purposes other than that of
foreclosure of the mortgage." 55 AM.JuR. 2DMortgages § 379, at 426-27 (1971).
141. See Winne v. Lahart, 155 Minn. 307, 193 N.W. 587, 588 (1923) (a note and a mortgage are
separate instruments and the negotiable character of the note does not affect the character of the
mortgage).
142. 325 N.W.2d at 257.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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careful to include acceleration clauses in both the promissory note
and the mortgage to insure that the mortgagee's remedies are not
limited in the event of default.
V. DEFENSES TO FORMATION OR ENFORCEMENT
A.

FRAUD

1. PioneerCredit Co. v. Medalen
The court in Pioneer Credit Co. v. Medalen1 5 stated that failure
to read the contract would not excuse the party from her
obligations. 146 The court did, however, note an exception to this
rule when the party can establish that she was prevented from
reading the document by fraud, artifice, or design by the other
party. 147
2. Hall GMC, Inc. v. Crane CarrierCo.
The court in Hall GMC, Inc. v. Crane CarrierCo. 148 examined a
series of issues related to the termination of a distributorship
agreement.1 4 9 The manufacturer, Crane, claimed that the
distributor, Hall, acted fraudulently when Hall exchanged three
refuse trucks for four concrete mixers and requested correction on
the Manufacturer's Statement of Origin to reflect that the mixers
were 1980 models. 1 50 The changes insured that Hall would receive
100 % of the net cost for the 1980 models when he terminated the
distributorship.15 1 Crane argued that Hall's actions were intended
to deceive and mislead him into believing that Hall would continue
to be a distributor, when in fact the exchange was merely to recoup
52
100% of the net cost upon termination. 1
145. 326 N.W.2d 717 (N.D. 1982). See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the facts in Pioneer Credit Co. v. Medalen.
146. Pioneer Credit Co. v. Medalen, 326 N.W.2d 717, 719 (1982).
147. Id. The affidavits presented to the trial court indicated that Medalen's failure to read the
"Guarantee of Payment" was entirely his own fault. Id. As a result, the court applied the general
rule that failure to read a contract does not excuse performance. Id.
148. 332 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1982). Previously, this Article discussed Hallwith regard to the issue
of equitable estoppel. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text for the discussion of Hall GMC,
Inc. v. Crane CarrierCo.
149. Hall GMC, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., 332 N.W.2d 54, 57 (N.D. 1982).
150. Id. at 59-60. Hall testified at trial that he had the manufacturer's statement of origin
changed to indicate that the four concrete mixers were 1980 models to facilitate their sale and to
improve the possibility that Crane would repurchase them if they terminated the distributorship
agreement. Id. at 58.
151. Id. at 59. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-01 (1982) (upon termination of a distributorship
agreement, the manufacturer must buy back all current year vehicles held by the retailer at 100% of
net cost).
152. 332 N.W.2d at 59-60.
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The court recognized that the case presented the potential of
both actual and constructive fraud as defined in the North Dakota
Century Code. 15 3 The court held, however, that Crane had not
proven the claims based on fraud. 154 The court concluded that the
trial court's determinations that Hall's decision to terminate was in
good faith, that he did not intend to deceive Crane, and that he had
55
not made any misrepresentations were not clearly erroneous. 1
The court emphasized that under North Dakota law Crane
was charged with knowledge of the laws of the state, including the
statutory right of termination in distributorship agreements. 156 The
court, therefore, did not accept Crane's argument that he was
misled by Hall, because he was charged with the knowledge that
amending the manufacturer's statement of origin would not limit
Hall's statutory right to terminate the distributorship agreement. 151
B.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

1. Hofmann v. Stoller
In Hofmann v. Stoller158 the parties entered into an oral
153. Id. Fraud in North Dakota is defined as either actual or constructive. N.D. CENT. CODE
9-03-07 (1975). Actual fraud is defined at N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-08 (1975). Section 9-03-08
provides:
Actual fraud within the meaning of this title consists in any of the following acts
committed by a party to the contract, or with his connivance, with intent to deceive
another party thereto or induce him to enter into the contract:
I. The suggestion as a fact of that which is not true by one who does not believe it
to be true;
2. The positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of the
person making it, of that which is not true though he believes it to be true;
3,The suppression of that which is true by one having knowledge or belief of the
fact;
4, A promise made without any intention of performing it; or
5, Any other act fitted to deceive.
Id. Constructive fraud is defined at N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-09 (1975). Section 9-03-09 provides:
Constructive fraud consists:
. In any breach of duty which, without an actually fraudulent intent, gains an
advantage to the person in fault or anyone claiming under him, by misleading
another to his prejudice or to the prejudice of anyone claiming under him; or
2. In any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent
without respect to actual fraud.
Id.
154. 332 N.W.2d at 60. The court did note that Hall's conduct in terminating the
distributorship agreement bordered on fraud. Id.
155. Id. The supreme court issued its usual reminder that when the evidence is conflicting, it
will normally defer to the trial court's determination of fact since it had the opportunity to weigh and
assess the credibility of the witnesses. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 320 N.W.2d 786 (N.D. 1982).
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agreement whereby Stoller leased a farmstead and milking barn for
one year from Hofmann. 15 9 Two months into the lease a fire
destroyed the milking barn and Stoller and Hofmann entered into a
second oral agreement whereby Stoller was allowed to share
Hofmann's barn until his barn was rebuilt. 160 A dispute arose over
what Stoller was to pay under the second oral agreement and
Stoller asserted the statute of frauds as a defense. 161 After losing at
the trial court level, Stoller appealed asserting that the trial court
applied an improper standard of proof in determining whether the
agreement was partially performed and thus exempt from the
statute of frauds. 162 Stoller argued that for purposes of the statute of
frauds the court must find that the contract was partially performed
by clear and convincing evidence. 1 63 The North Dakota Supreme
Court, however, agreed with the trial court and concluded tIiat the
Uniform Commercial Code applied in this case and that it had the
effect of relaxing the standard of proof for excepting agreements
from the statute of frauds. 164 The court, therefore, applied the
Uniform Commercial Code standard of a preponderance of the
evidence rather than the clear and convincing standard that the
159. Hofmann v. Stoller, 320 N.W.2d 786, 788 (N.D. 1982). There was no dispute over the
terms of the first lease agreement. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. Stoller's cows were fed grain and minerals from Hofmann's supply. Id. His cows also
grazed on Hofmann's land. Id. The dispute in this case was over' the amount Stoller was to pay for
feed, grain, minerals, grazing rights, and electricity. Id. Stoller insisted that he was to pay nothing.
Id. Hofmann insisted that he was to pay one-half of the total cost for the-entire operation. Id.
162. Id. at 790. The trial court held that the feed and minerals contract was controlled by the
Uniform Commercial Code, specifically 5 41-02-08 of the North Dakota Century Code and the
exception to the statute of frauds found at § 41-02-08 (3) (c). Id. Section 41-02-08 provides in part:
1. Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of.goods for the
price of five hundred dollars or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense
unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been
made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it
omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable
under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing....
3.

A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection I but which is
valid in other respects is enforceable. ...
c. With respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which
have been received and accepted (section 41-02-69).

N.D. CENT. CoDE § 41-02-08 (1983).
The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Stoller received and accepted
grain and minerals for his cows and therefore the statute of frauds was not a bar to Hofmann's
recovery on the oral contract. 320 N.W.2d at 791.
163. 320 N.W.2d at 790. Stoller based his argument on Buettner v. Nostdahl, 204 N.W.2d 187
(N.D. 1973). Buettner requires that before a contract may be excepted from the statute of frauds, the
existence of the contract must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and the acts relied upon as
constituting part performance must unmistakenly point to the existence of the agreement. 204
N.W.2d at 195.
164. 320 N.W.2d at 790. The supreme court distinguished Buettner on the grounds that it was a
non-Code transaction and was not applicable. Id.
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court has applied in noncommercial contract cases in North
Dakota.

C.

65

AGENCY

1. Cook v. Jacklitch & Sons, Inc.
In Cook v.Jacklitch &Sons, Inc. 166 the defendant claimed that he
was not personally liable under a contract because he was acting
solely as an agent for a corporation.' 67 The court reviewed the
record and refused to limit the defendant's personal liability., 68 The
court stressed that the plaintiffs believed they were contracting with
the defendant in his individual capacity, that there was no
discussion between the parties regarding the defendant's agency
status, and that the defendant's signature did not indicate that he
69
was signing only in a representative capacity.'
VI. REMEDIAL ISSUES
A.

DAMAGES

1. Hirschkorn v. Severson
The trial court in Hirschkorn v. Severson'7 ° dismissed the
plaintiff's action and held for the defendant on his counterclaim. 1 7
The trial court awarded interest to the defendant at the rate of ten
percent even though there was no interest rate expressed in any
written agreement between the parties. 7 2 The trial court
165. Id.
166. 315 N.W.2d 660 (N.D. 1982). The Cooks entered into a written contract to havejacklitch
& Sons build them a house. Cook v. Jacklitch & Sons, Inc., 315 N.W,2d 660, 661 (N.D. 1982). After
construction began, the Cooks ordered Jacklitch & Sons to stop working because they were
performing negligently. Id. The trial court found that the Cooks were justified in terminating the
contract and awarded the Cooks $2500 in compensatory damages. Id. The trial court also found
LeroyJacklitch personally liable on the contract. Id. at 664.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 319 N.W.2d 475 (N.D. 1982). Hirschkorn involved an action by the plaintiffs to establish the
existence of an oral contract to buy out the defendant's interest in a small corporation. Hirschkorn v.
Severson, 319 N.W.2d 475, 476 (N. D. 1982). The defendant counterclaimed for past due dividends.
Id.
171. Id. at 479-80. The trial court found that the plaintiffs breached their fiduciary duty to the
defendant in not paying him dividends. Id.
172. Id. at 480. In awarding the 10% interest rate the trial court apparently did not apply S 4714-05 of the North Dakota Century Code. Section 47-14-05 provides:
Interestfor any legal indebtedness shall be at the rate of six percent per annum unless a different rate
not to exceed the rate specified in section 47-14-09 is contractedfor in writing. All contracts shall
bear the same rate of interest after maturity as they bear before maturity, and any
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acknowledged the defendant's argument that Klitzke v. Klitzke, 17 3 a
divorce case, constituted persuasive precedent for awarding interest
17 4
above the legal rate on equitable grounds.
However, the supreme court reversed the trial court on the
interest issue noting that if it allowed the lower court's holding to
stand, the variation of interest rates awarded in actions would
arbitrarily be based on whether the case was legal or equitable. 17 5
The court believed such a distinction was unfair and would be
difficult to ascertain. 17 6 Although the court admitted that awarding
only the legal rate of interest, six percent, was inequitable, it felt
constrained by section 47-14-05 of the North Dakota Century Code
177
to limit prejudgment interest to six percent.
The Hirschkorn case emphasizes the importance of providing an
interest rate clause in most contracts to insure that judgments based
on the breach of the agreement are subject to interest at a rate
nearer the market rate. Without such a provision, it is likely that
there may be instances when the prolonging of a law suit in a major
case may be economically worthwhile to one of the parties, because
the legal rate of interest is much less than prevailing market rates.
A party might, therefore, deem it worthwhile to avoid payment of
its contractual obligations for a lengthy period of time, particularly
in cases that present legitimate legal issues, to take advantage of the
abnormally low legal rate payable on such judgments. In cases
involving substantial sums of money, the legal rate of six percent
may constitute a disincentive to settlement in marginal cases and
may actually serve as an incentive to prolong lawsuits. Evidently,
with these arguments in mind, Justice VandeWalle appeared to
have been endeavoring to send a message to the legislature,
encouraging it to consider a flexible rate of prejudgment interest as
contract attempting to make the rate of interest higher after maturity shall be void as
to such increase of interest, except for a charge for late payment penalty charged in
addition to interest which may not exceed fifteen dollars or fifteen percent of the late
payment, whichever is less, unless otherwise agreed to in the real estate note or
mortgage.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-14-05 (Supp. 1983) (emphasis added). The court, therefore, remanded with
instruction to apply the legal rate of six percent per annum. 319 N.W.2d at 480.
173. 308 N.W.2d 385 (N.D. 1981).
174. 319 N.W.2d at 480. In Klitzke the supreme court stated that § 47-14-05 did not limit a
court's ability to make an equitable distribution of property in a divorce and that in doing so, the
court could require a party to pay interest at a higher rate than the statutory rate. Klitzke v. Klitzke,
308 N.W.2d 385, 390 (N.D. 1981).
175. 319 N.W.2d at 480. The court distinguished Klitzke stating that since it was a divorce
action, the award of interest was controlled by § 14-05-24. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 14-05-24
(1981) (grants the court broad powers to make equitable distributions of property in divorce cases).
176. 319 N.W.2d at 480.
177. Id.
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a statutory matter.17 8 Legislative activity in this area would appear
to be particularly appropriate.
2. Hofmann v. Stoller
The court in Hofmann v. Stoller 179 noted the difference between
incidental damages, which are recoverable by a seller, and
consequential damages, which are not recoverable. 180 The court
stated:
While the distinction between the two is not an obvious
one, the [Uniform Commercial] Code makes plain that
incidental damages are normally incurred when a buyer
(or seller) repudiates the contract or wrongfully rejects the
goods, causing the other to incur such expenses as
transporting, storing, or reselling the goods. On the other
hand, consequential damages do not arise within the
scope of the immediate buyer-seller transaction, but
rather stem from losses incurred by the non-breaching
party in its dealings, often with third parties, which were
a proximate result of the breach, and which were
reasonably foreseeable by the breaching party at the time
of contracting. 81
The distinction between consequential and incidental damages set
forth in Hofmann remains unclear. The language, however, does
appear to lay out certain guidelines within which to marshall one's
82
evidence on such damage issues. 1
-178. Id. In the opinion of the court, Justice VandeWalle noted that the six percent rate was
inequitable, but he indicated that flexible interest rates could only be established by statute. Id.
179. 320 N.W.2d 786 (N.D. 1982). See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the factual situation underlying Hofmann v. Stoller.
180. Hofmann v. Stoller, 320 N.W.2d 786, 792 (N.D. 1982).
181. Id. (quoting Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., Petro v. Ameropan Oil Corp., 372 F.Supp. 503, 508
(E.D.N.Y. 1974)).
182. Further help in this area may be found in the Uniform Commercial Code as codified in the
North Dakota Century Code. See N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 41 (1983).
It is important to note that the Century Code limits a seller to incidental damages. N.D. CENT.
CODE S 41-02-89 (1983). Section 41-02-89 [U.C.C. S 2-710 (1978)] provides: "Incidental damages to
an aggrieved seller include any commercially reasonable charges, expenses, or commissions incurred
in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care, and custody of goods after the buyer's breach, in
connection with return or resale of the goods, or otherwise resulting from the breach." Id.
An aggrieved buyer, however, is entitled to both incidental damages and consequential
damages. Id. § 42-02-94. Section 41-02-94 [U.C.C. § 2-715 (1978)] provides:
I.Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses reasonably
incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation, and care and custody of goods
rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses, or
commissions in connection with effecting cover, and any other reasonable expense
incident to the delay or other breach.
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3. Kulseth v. Rotenberger
The court in Kulseth v. Rotenberger183 allowed a contractor to
recover under quantum meruit, although he did not substantially
perform his obligations under the contract. 184 The court noted
that to recover under quantum meruit the contractor must prove the
value of his performance before the owner has the burden to prove
a lack of substantial performance and the reduction in value or cost
of repairs attributable to the contractor's breach. 185 The court
acknowledged the definition of quantum meruit as provided in section
186
374 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
4. Storebo v. Foss
In Storebo v. Foss'87 the court noted that the proper measure of

damage when a contractor breaches a construction contract, which
cannot be remedied without reconstruction or material injury to a
substantial portion of the building, is diminution in value. 188 The
court, however, affirmed the lower court's holding that awarded
2. Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include:
a. Any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which
the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
b. Injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of
warranty.
Id.
183. 320 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1982). Russell Kulseth was a builder who contracted to build a
shop for Bill Rotenberger. Kulseth v. Rotenberger, 320 N.W.2d 920, 921 (N.D. 1982). When the
building was close to completion, a dispute arose and all work stopped. Id. Rotenberger refused to
pay the full contract price and Kulseth sued to recover in quantum meruit. Id. at 922.
184. Id.at 923. Testimony at trial indicated that the shop was 90% completed. Id. at 921.
185. Id. at 923.
186. Id. Section 374 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides:
(1) Subject to the rule stated in Subsection (2), if a party justifiably refuses to perform
on the ground that his remaining duties of performance have been discharged by the
other party's breach, the party in breach is entitled to restitution for any benefit that
he has conferred by way of part performance or reliance in excess of the loss that he has
caused by his own breach.
(2) To the extent that, under the manifested assent of the parties, a party's
performance is to be retained in the case of breach, that party is not entitled to
restitution if the value of the performance as liquidated damages is reasonable in the
light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof
of loss.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 374 (1981).

187. 325 N.W.2d 223 (N.D. 1982). This case arose when Gerald Foss refused to pay for cement
work done by Donald Storebo, claiming that the work did not conform to the contract. Storebo v.
Foss, 325 N.W.2d 223, 224 (N.D. 1982). Storebo filed a mechanics' lien against the property in
question and Foss counterclaimed for damages. Id.
188. Id. at 225. In Storebo, the court could have determined diminution of value damages by
subtracting the value of the property with the defective basement from the value of the property with
a properly constructed basement. Id.
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damages based on the expense that Foss would incur to make the
work conform to the agreement. 18 9 The supreme court concluded
that "the trial court could properly find that the defects in the
basement floor could be remedied without taking down and
reconstructing a substantial portion of the building." 190
5. Hall GMC, Inc. v. Crane CarrierCo.
In Hall GMC, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co. 191 the appellee, Crane,
challenged the trial court's damage award. 1 92 The trial court
awarded Hall $52,223.97 in damages for the interest Hall paid to
its creditor commencing sixty days after Hall mailed its letter
requesting the mutual termination
of a distributorship
agreement. 193
Crane first challenged the interest award because it was not
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting
and therefore amounted to prejudgment interest.194 In response to
Crane's first argument, the court concluded that the question of
whether special damages of this sort were reasonably within the
contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting was a
question of fact. 195 The trial court found that at the time the parties
executed the agreement Crane knew that Hall would be borrowing
money from GMAC financing to cover its inventory. The finance
charges, therefore, were a proper element of damages and were not
prejudgment interest subject to the six percent limitation discussed
in Hirschkorn v. Severson. 196
Crane also argued that the court should have computed
damages from 60 days after Hall's February 25. 1980, letter of
unilateral cancellation rather than from the earlier January 22,
1980, letter from Hall seeking mutual termination. 97 The court
relied on the specific language of the distributor agreement, which
provided for termination by mutual consent of the parties at any
time or unilaterally by Hall upon not less than 60 days written
189. Id. at 226.
190. Id. The court treated the issue as factual and applied the clearly erroneous rule. Id.
191. 332 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1983). See supra notes 39-43, 148-57 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the other issues raised in Hall GMC, Inc. v. Crane CarrierCo.
192. Hall GMC, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., 332 N.W.2d 54, 56 (N.D. 1983).
193. Id. at 58. The interest arose because Hall had to finance its inventory of vehicles, four
cement mixers, which it received from Crane. Id.
194. Id. at 62-63.
195. Id. at 62.
196. Id. at 62-63. See supra notes 170-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the six
percent limitation rule of Hirschkornv. Severson.
197. 332 N.W.2d at 63. Crane declined to mutually terminate the distributorship after the
January 22, 1980 letter. Id.
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notice to Crane. Based on the distributor agreement the court
concluded that the January 22,1980, letter neither satisfied the legal
requirements for termination nor constituted a unilateraf
termination of the distributorship capable of triggering the
applicable 60-day time period. 198 Because the trial court's use of the
January 22, 1980, letter was inappropriate, the supreme court
reversed, holding that damages could not begin any sooner than 60
days after February 25, 1980, and modified the judgment to reflect
99
this determination. 1
The Hall decision illustrates the importance of drafting letters
of cancellation or termination very carefully to strictly comply with
the formalities prescribed by the agreement being terminated. The
Hall case also shows how a party can avoid the six percent
limitation on prejudgment interest 20 0 by converting interest into a
special damage, reasonably contemplated by the parties at the time
they execute the contract.
B. RESCISSION
1. Berg v. Hogan
In Berg v. Hogan20' an auctioneer brought a breach of contract
action against a high bidder who stopped payment on a check the
bidder gave as a down payment. 20 2 The bidder argued that his bid
was fraudulently inflated by bids of the seller or the seller's
agents and did not form a binding contract. 203 The court indicated
that when the bidder sensed that the seller was bidding up the
equipment, he had the duty to find out what the true situation
was and to promptly rescind or ratify the agreement. 2 4 Since the
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 47-14-05 (Supp. 1983). See supra note 172 for the text of S 47-14-05.
201. 322 N.W.2d 448 (N.D. 1982). Harry Berg conducted an auction of spraying equipment for
Midstate Leasing, Inc. Berg v. Hogan, 322 N.W.2d 448, 449 (N.D. 1982). Terry Hogan was high
bidder on a particular piece of equipment, but later refused to pay for it. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 450. Section 41-02-45 of the North Dakota Century Code provides in relevant part:
If the auctioneer knowingly receives a bid on the seller's behalf or the seller makes or
procures such a bid, and notice has not been given that liberty for such bidding is
'reserved, the buyer may at his option avoid the sale or take the goods at the price of the
last good faith bid prior to the completion of the sale. This subsection shall not apply to
any bid at a forced sale.
N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-45 (4)(1983).
204. 322 N.W.2d at 451-52. The trial court found that Hogan first knew of the illegal bidding on
May 7, 1980, the day of the auction. Id. at 449. The trial court also found that Hogan did not givc
notice of his intention to rescind until July 7, 1980. Id.
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bidder performed acts that indicated ratification at a time when he
had actual or constructive knowledge of the situation, he was not
205
entitled to rescind the purchase.

The Berg case indicates that even though section 9-09-04 of the
North Dakota Century Code contains the phrase "and is aware of
his right to rescind,'' 20 6 the court will limit the right of rescission to
cases in which a party knew or should have known of her right to
rescind and acted promptly once she has or should have that
knowledge.

207

VII. MISCELLANEOUS
A.

IMPLIED WARRANTIES

1. Koland, Inc. v. Hanggi
In Koland, Inc. v. Hanggi,20 8 a construction case, the court
reiterated the rule that an implied warranty of fitness exists when:
(1) the contractor expressly or by implication holds itself out as
competent to undertake the contract; and the owner (2) has no
particular expertise in the kind of work contemplated; (3) furnishes
no plans, designs, specifications, details, or blueprints; and (4)
tacitly or expressly indicates her reliance on the experience and skill
of the contractor, after making her aware of the specific purposes
for which the building is intended. 20 9 The court also noted that the
implied warranty issue is an issue of fact. 21 0 The court affirmed the
trial court's decision, concluding that the trial court's
determination of the implied warranty issue was not clearly
erroneous.
B.

THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES

1. O'Connell v. EntertainmentEnterprises
The court in O'Connell v. Entertainment Enterprises21 ' noted thai
205. Id. at 453. Hogan's acts that indicated ratification of-the contract included stating that he
would pay in full, negotiating for a noncompetition agreement, and stating that he would not
perform because he was unable to obtain the entire business. Id. at 449.
206. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-04(1) (1975).
207. See 322 N.W.2d at 452-53.
208. 320 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1982). Koland, Inc. contracted to build a steel building for
Hanggi. Koland, Inc. v. Hanggi, 320 N.W.2d 502, 503 (N.D. 1982). Upon completion, Hanggi
refused final payment because of defects in the construction. Id.
209. Id. at 506. The court first expressed the implied warranty of fitness test in Dobler v.
Malloy, 214 N.W.2d 510, 516 (N.D. 1973) (implied warranty of fitness can be invoked even in
situations when the contractor builds from the owner's plans).
210. 320 N.W.2d at 506.
211. 317 N.W.2d 385 (N.D. 1982). See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the facts in O'Connell v. Entertainment Enterprises.
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to recover on a third party beneficiary theory, the contract the third
party relied upon must be expressly made to benefit the third
party. 2 12 On the record, the court concluded that O'Connell was
merely an incidental, as opposed to an express, beneficiary of the
2 13
contract he sought to enforce.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts takes a more liberal
view with regard to third party beneficiaries, providing only that
the beneficiary prove that she was an "intended beneficiary" of the
contract. 214 Since the legislature had not opted for the more flexible
or liberal approach of the Restatement, however, the court felt
constrained to limit recovery under the third party beneficiary
theory to those "expressly"
intended to benefit from the
agreement. 21 5 While the court may have been appropriately
reticent to extend the third party beneficiary theory in light of the
specific language contained in the statute, this is another area
in which the legislature might be advised to reconsider its fairly
inflexible stance, particularly in light of the trend toward flexibility
in other areas.
VIII. CONCLUSION
An article such as this can be little more than what it purports
to be - a survey. While the Article's scope was limited to contract
cases arising during 1982 and the first half of 1983, it was a fairly
formidable task just to summarize the cases. Nevertheless, the
Article does attempt to highlight trends and on occasion, give some
practical advice. As such, it is hoped that the Article will be of
benefit to the practicing bar, even if it constitutes more of an
introduction to the issues discussed than a scholarly discussion of
those issues.
212. O'Connell v. Entertainment Enter., 317 N.W.2d 385, 387 (N.D. 1982). The court relied
on S 9-02-04 of the North Dakota Century Code, which provides: "[A] contract made expressly for
the benefit of a third person may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind
it." N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-02-04 (1975).
213. 317 N.W.2d at 388.
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS S 302 (1981). Section 302 provides:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a
promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay
money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary
the benefit of the promised performance.
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary.

215. 317 N.W.2d at 388.

